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Casenote
Almand v. DeKalb County, Georgia: Where
to Draw the Line Between a Police Officer's
Private Acts and Acts Taken Under the
Color of State Law
I. Introduction
The issue of whether a person acts under the color of state
law for the purpose of 42 U.S.C. section 19831 ("section 1983")
"is no simple question of fact;"2 it is a detailed factual inquiry.3
The intricacy of this question is further compounded when a po-
lice officer is named as a defendant in a section 1983 claim be-
cause the distinction between a private act and an act
accomplished under the color of state law becomes much more
difficult to define.4
In order to establish a successful claim under section 1983,
a plaintiff must show that the defendant acted under the color
of state law and deprived her of a constitutional right.5 The
Supreme Court has given an expansive reading to the provision
1. Every person who, under the color of any statute, ordinance regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, sub-
jects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other per-
son within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper pro-
ceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
2. Almand v. DeKalb County, Georgia, 103 F.3d 1510, 1513 (11th Cir. 1997)
(citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 996-98 (1982)).
3. See id.
4. See id. at 1514-15.
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
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to allow damage suits against state officers. 6 The Court has
adopted the rule that "misuse of power, possessed by virtue of
state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is
clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken 'under
color' of state law."7 At first blush, it may appear that an act
committed by a state officer who deprives another of either their
constitutional or federal statutory rights is under the color of
state law.8 However, not all acts by state employees are acts
under the color of state law.9 The Supreme Court has held that
"the dispositive issue is whether the official was acting pursu-
ant to the power he/she possessed by state authority or acting
only as a private citizen."10 Hence, a person whose status as a
police officer has made it possible for him to deprive another of a
constitutional right has acted under the color of state law."
Although the Supreme Court provides some guidance, 12 draw-
ing the line between private acts and acts under the color of
state law may be a difficult task.
Recently, in Almand v. DeKalb County, Georgia,13 the Elev-
enth Circuit held that a police officer, who allegedly raped the
plaintiff did not act under the color of state law pursuant to sec-
tion 1983.14 The police officer gained access to the plaintiffs
apartment on the pretense of discussing police business, left the
apartment, and then forcibly reentered. 15 The majority re-
stricted the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 1983 by
drawing the line between acting under the color of state law and
acting as a private individual, at the front door of the plaintiffs
apartment. 16 Dismissing the plaintiffs section 1983 suit, the
majority noted that if the defendant had raped the plaintiff dur-
6. See Leon Friedman, New Developments in Civil Rights Litigation and
Trends in § 1983 Actions, 554 PLI/Lit 7, 15 (1996).
7. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941).
8. See supra note 1.
9. See Almand, 103 F.3d at 1513.
10. Edwards v. Wallace Community College, 49 F.3d 1517, 1523 (1995) (citing
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961), overruled on other grounds by Monell v.
New York City Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).
11. See id.; see also Classic, 313 U.S. at 326.
12. See Edwards, 49 F.3d at 1523.
13. 103 F.3d 1510.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 1515.
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ing his initial entry into her apartment, his actions would have
been under the color of state law.17
On the other hand, the dissent maintained that the defend-
ant's actions were taken under the color of state law.18 The dis-
sent's opinion, in the tradition of the Supreme Court's reading
of section 1983 where a state officer is named as defendant, ap-
plies a more expansive notion of acting under the color of state
law to the facts of Almand.19 The dissent found that it was pos-
sible for a fact finder to conclude that the defendant was able to
rape Almand because he was clothed with the authority of state
law. 2
0
Under the circumstances of Almand, the majority inappro-
priately engages in line drawing where there is a genuine issue
of fact as to whether the defendant acted under the color of
state law. 2' The majority's narrow definition of the acting
under the color of state law requirement, in effect, makes it dif-
ficult for a victim to bring a section 1983 claim against a state
officer, and thus limits the statute's purpose.
Part II begins with the history of section 1983 and its treat-
ment by the Supreme Court and the federal circuit courts. Part
III discusses the Eleventh Circuit's treatment of section 1983 in
the context of Almand v. DeKalb County, Georgia.22 Part IV
analyzes the Eleventh Circuit's treatment of section 1983 in
light of the Supreme Court interpretation, reaching the ulti-
mate conclusion that the majority's analysis was flawed and
that the dissent's opinion applied the correct analysis. In addi-
tion, Part IV proposes a balancing test to assist the courts in
resolving the question of whether the unlawful action by a state
officer was taken under the color of state law.
17. See id.
18. See Almand, 103 F.3d at 1516 (Aldrich, J., dissenting).
19. See id.; see also supra note 6 and accompanying text.
20. See Almand, 103 F.3d at 1516-17.
21. See id. at 1515; see also supra text accompanying note 15.
22. 103 F.3d 1510.
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II. Background
A. History
Originally, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was passed as section one of
the Civil Rights Act of 1871, known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, 23
in response to the terrorism of the Ku Klux Klan directed at
blacks in the South.24 Its purpose was not to create a remedy
against the Ku Klux Klan or its members, but against those
who represented a state in some capacity and failed to enforce
the state's criminal laws against the Ku Klux Klan.25 The bill
was passed by Rep. Samuel Shellabarger (R., Ohio); "[Section
one], now codified as 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, was the subject of only
limited debate and was passed without amendment."26 For the
first seventy years of its existence, section 1983 was largely ig-
nored.27 Between 1871 and 1920, only twenty-one cases were
decided under section 1983 due to the ineffectiveness of the civil
rights laws after Civil War Reconstruction and the political de-
velopments of the period. 28 In the South, Democrats resented
the radical reconstructionist control of their state governments
by Republicans and were determined to weaken Republican
control and black gains.29 During the middle to late 1870s,
"[riacial prejudice, in both the North and the South, under-
mined the radical Republican position and strengthened that of
the Southern Democrats."30 Therefore, the civil rights laws of
the 1860s and early 1870s did not develop. 31 Not until the
twentieth century would the American social, political, and eco-
nomic climate facilitate "even modest enforcement of civil rights
laws."32 Therefore, much of the meaning of section 1983 and its
23. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600, 628
(1979) (noting section one of the 1871 Civil Rights Act "was modeled after section
two of the 1866 [Civil Rights Act].. .it granted a private cause of action; and... it
encompassed the deprivation, under color of state law, of 'any rights privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States'").
24. See THEODORE EISENBERG, CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION CASES AND MATERI-
ALS, 65 (Michie, 4th ed. 1996).
25. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 175-76 (1961).
26. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 665 (1978).
27. See Friedman, 554 PLI/Lit at 7.
28. See Eisenberg, at 69-70.
29. See id.
30. Id. at 70.
31. See id.
32. Id.
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usefulness is derived from modern interpretation by the
Supreme Court.
B. Supreme Court's Treatment of Section 1983 Requirements
1. Acting Under the Color of State Law Requirement
A plaintiff is required to prove that the defendant was act-
ing under the color of state law to bring a successful section
1983 claim.33 The Supreme Court addressed the meaning of
acting under the color of state law in Monroe v. Pape,34 and in-
terpreted this requirement broadly to allow damage suits
against state officers. 35 In Monroe, the plaintiffs' home was
searched without a warrant by the Chicago police, and Mr.
Monroe was arrested without a warrant or an arraignment. 36
The plaintiffs claimed that such action by the Chicago police
"constituted a deprivation of their 'rights, privileges and immu-
nities secured by the Constitution' within the meaning of sec-
tion 1983." 37 Before ruling in favor of the plaintiffs, the Court
noted that the existence of Illinois' constitution and laws that
outlaw unreasonable search and seizure did not supplant the
availability of a federal remedy.38 Ultimately, the Court de-
cided that the defendants' actions amounted to a violation of
section 1983, 39 relying upon United States v. Classic,40 which
held that "misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and
made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the
authority of state law, is action taken under the color of state
law."4 1
The Monroe Court also relied upon its decision in Screws v.
United States,42 which reaffirmed the expansive construction of
the "under the color of state law" concept set forth in Classic. In
Screws, the plaintiffs claimed that state officers did not make an
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
34. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
35. See id.; see also supra note 6 and accompanying text.
36. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 169.
37. Id. at 170.
38. See id. at 183.
39. See id.
40. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
41. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 184 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299,
326 (1941)).
42. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
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effective arrest and were liable under section 1983. 43 There, the
defendants argued that a federal remedy should not apply
where there is adequate state relief.44 The Court rejected this
argument and held once again that the federal remedy is sup-
plemental to the state law. 45
Thus, the Court in Monroe adopted the Classic rule which
provides for a broad reading of "under the color of state law"
and made it clear that the availability of a state remedy is irrel-
evant to section 1983 analysis. 46 The Court held that if a state
officer acted under the color of his legal authority he could be
sued under section 1983, even if his acts were unlawful under
state law.47
2. Deprivation of Federal Statutory and Constitutional
Rights Requirement
To establish a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must also
prove that the defendant violated a federal statutory or consti-
tutional right.48 Section 1983 originated from section one of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871, and it only provided a cause of action
for violations of constitutional rights. 49 In 1874, Congress con-
solidated the United States laws, and the phrase "and laws"
was added.50 It states in pertinent part: "or immunities se-
cured by the Constitution and laws shall be liable to the party
injured in the action at law, suit at equity, or other proper pro-
ceeding for redress."5 1 However, it is difficult to assess what
Congress meant by the insertion of the phrase because the leg-
islative history is sparse and thus, does not provide a clear ex-
planation of Congress' intent.52 Therefore, the Supreme Court,
confronted with the issue of what type of laws or statutory
43. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 184 (citing Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91,
108 (1945)).
44. See id.
45. See id.; see also supra note 38 and accompanying text.
46. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183-87.
47. See id.
48. See supra note 1.
49. See EISENBERG, at 111.
50. See Thiboutot v. Maine, 448 U.S. 1, 15 (1980).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994)(emphasis added).
52. See Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 7 (citing generally Chapman v. Houston, 441
U.S. 600 (1979)).
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rights section 1983 encompasses, has relied on a plain meaning
analysis and precedent.5 3
The Supreme Court interpreted the phrase "and laws" and
explained the scope of section 1983 in Maine v. Thiboutot.5 In
Thiboutot, the Court addressed the issue of "whether the
phrase 'and laws' as used in § 1983, means what it says, or
whether it should be limited to some subset of laws."55 The case
involved a claim under section 1983 by welfare recipients alleg-
ing that the Maine Department of Human Services violated the
Social Security Act by terminating their welfare benefits. 56 The
state argued that the phrase "and laws" should only include
civil rights or equal protection laws, but this argument was re-
jected by the Court.57 The Court held that section 1983 in-
cluded the deprivation of federal statutory rights, in particular,
the Social Security Act. Looking to the plain language of the
statute, the Court stated that the words "and laws" clearly en-
compass a violation of a federal law such as the Social Security
Act.58
Next, the Court focused on previous cases which inter-
preted section 1983 to include federal statutory violations in ad-
dition to constitutional violations.5 9 One such case was Rosado
v. Wyman. 60 There, the Court decided that a remedy under sec-
tion 1983 was appropriate where the state violated a Social Se-
curity Act provision. 61 Relying on Rosado and other precedent,
the Court concluded that the welfare recipients stated a cause
of action under section 1983.62 As a result of the Thiboutot deci-
sion, the Court has given a broad reading to the phrase "and
laws," thereby expanding the scope of section 1983 to reach a
greater number of plaintiffs.
53. See id. at 4 (The Court stated that "[e]ven were the language ambiguous,
however, any doubt to its meaning has been resolved by our several cases sug-
gesting, explicitly, or implicitly, that the § 1983 remedy broadly encompasses vio-
lations of federal statutory as well as constitutional law." Id.).
54. 448 U.S. 1.
55. See id. at 4.
56. See id. at 2.
57. See id. at 6.
58. See id. at 4.
59. See Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 4-5.
60. 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
61. See Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 4-5.
62. See id. at 4-6.
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3. The Relationship Between the Concepts of Action
Under the Color of State Law and State Action
The Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment requirement of state action and the "under the color of
state law" requirement in section 1983 are not necessarily iden-
tical concepts. 63 There may be action under the color of state
law, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that does not con-
stitute state action.64 One such example is where a private
claimant himself invokes a state statute, without meeting re-
quirements of the Fourteenth Amendment set forth by the
Supreme Court.65 According to the Supreme Court, in order for
action under the color of law to be state action the following
must be satisfied: (1) "the deprivation must be caused by the
exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a
rule of conduct imposed by the state or by a person for whom
the State is responsible";66 (2) "the party charged with the dep-
rivation must be a person who may be fairly said to be a state
actor."67 Where a private person looks like a state actor, state
action can be found when there is a "close nexus" or "symbiotic
relationship" between acts of private persons and a state.68
However, the Supreme Court has maintained that in a section
1983 claim brought against a police officer, or other state offi-
cial, the action under the color of state law and the constitu-
tional state action requirements are identical.69
63. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 n.18 (1982). The
Court reaffirmed its holding in an earlier case, Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 436 U.S.
149 at 155-56 (1978), and stated that action under the color of state law may not
always qualify as state action. See id.
64. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 935 n.18.
65. See id.
66. Id. at 937.
67. Id.
68. See Friedman, 554 PLJILit at 21 (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961)).
69. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 929 (citing Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-
347 (1879) (where the Court ruled that the actions of a state officer who exceeds
the limits of his authority constitute state action for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment)).
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C. The Qualified Immunity Defense
In Almand, the defendant moved for summary judgment on
qualified immunity grounds.70 His motion was denied by the
district court and he appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.71 In
granting the defendant's summary judgment motion, the court
relied on the procedures set forth by the Supreme Court in
Harlow v. Fitzgerald.72
The Harlow Court defined qualified immunity or "good
faith" immunity as "an affirmative defense that must be
pleaded by a defendant official." 73 It has both subjective and ob-
jective elements. The Court has held that the "objective ele-
ment involves a presumptive knowledge and of respect for
'basic, unquestionable constitutional rights'[,]" 74 while the sub-
jective element is the officer's intent.75 Therefore, considering
both the objective and subjective elements, the qualified immu-
nity defense does not cover an official who "knew or reasonably
should have known that the action he took within his sphere of
official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of
the [plaintiff], or if he took the action with malicious intention
to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other in-
jury. ...- 76 In order to avoid insubstantial claims, when a public
official pleads a defense of qualified immunity on summary
judgment, the judge appropriately may determine whether the
law was clearly established at the time an action occurred.77 If
the law was clearly known, the defense should fail since a rea-
sonably competent official should know the law governing his
conduct. 78
In Siegert v. Gilley,79 the Supreme Court, applying Harlow,
held that "a necessary concomitant to the determination of
whether the constitutional right asserted by a plaintiff is
'clearly established' at the time the defendant acted [that is, the
70. See Almand, 103 F.3d at 1512.
71. See id.
72. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
73. Id. at 815.
74. Id. at 815 (quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975)).
75. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-16.
76. Id. at 815 (emphasis added).
77. See id. at 815-19.
78. See id.
79. 500 U.S. 226 (1991).
595
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qualified immunity question] is the determination of whether
the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional right at
all."80 The rationale for the Court's decision involved a concern
for judicial economy; "one of the purposes of immunity, absolute
or qualified, is to spare a defendant not only unwarranted liabil-
ity, but unwarranted demands customarily imposed upon those
defending a long drawn out lawsuit."81
Siegert demonstrates the strength of qualified immunity as
a defense for a state officer defending a section 1983 claim.
Since the plaintiff in Siegert failed not only to allege the viola-
tion of a constitutional right that was clearly established at the
time of Gilley's actions, but also failed to establish any constitu-
tional right at all, he was not able to defeat the defendant's
qualified immunity defense.8 2 A section 1983 claimant who can-
not defeat a defense of qualified immunity has not established a
violation of any constitutional rights and fails to fulfill the ele-
ments of a section 1983 claim. In essence, a successful qualified
immunity defense allows a state officer to circumvent a section
1983 claim.
D. The Circuit Courts' Interpretation of Acting Under the
Color of State Law
Recent federal circuit opinions further define the meaning
of section 1983 and its impact. In Parker v. Williams8 3 a jury
found that a chief jailer who raped an arrestee, the sheriff who
hired him, and the county were all liable under section 1983.84
On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, the jury's determination that
the chief jailer acted under the color of law was not
challenged.8 5
Lolita Parker was arrested in Alabama after "she hit a wo-
man on the head with a glass during a bar scuffle."86 Parker
spent the night in the Macon County jail.8 7 The next morning,
James Williams, the chiefjailer, agreed to arrange for her bail if
80. Id. at 232.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 862 F.2d 1471 (11th Cir. 1989).
84. See id. at 1474.
85. See id
86. Id. at 1473.
87. See id.
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she would pose nude for sexually explicit photographs.88 Wil-
liams arranged for Parker's bail and she was supposed to meet
him at a nearby store but instead she went to a friend's house.8 9
Williams learned of Parker's location and, while in his uniform,
went to her friend's house.90 He informed Parker that her bail
had been revoked and that she would have to return to jail with
him.91 Parker left with Williams, believing that she was going
back to jail, but instead, he took her to his house and raped
her.92
The jury concluded that the defendant abused his power as
a state official, thereby violating section 1983. 93 They relied on
the fact that the defendant, a uniformed and on-duty police of-
ficer, coerced the plaintiff into leaving with him so that he could
bring her to his house to rape her.94
The Fifth Circuit, in Bennett v. Pippin,95 concluded that a
section 1983 claim was established when a sheriff raped a mur-
der suspect.96 In Bennett, the plaintiff shot her husband in the
chest after a violent domestic dispute, during which he pointed
a gun at her.97 The violence and subsequent murder occurred in
their rental home in Archer County. 98 Following the shooting,
Bennett drove over the county line into Wichita Falls and re-
ported herself to the Wichita authorities. 99 The Wichita police
arrested Bennett and held her until the Archer County sheriff,
Presly Pippin, arrived to take her into custody. 00 Pippin re-
turned the plaintiff to her home, but she was later taken to the
Archer County Sheriffs Office by a deputy sheriff.'0 ' After the
88. See Parker, 862 F.2d at 1473.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See Parker, 862 F.2d at 1473.
94. See id.
95. 74 F.3d 578 (5th Cir. 1996).
96. See id.
97. See id. at 583.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See Bennett, 74 F.3d at 583.
101. See id.
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plaintiff was "booked" and questioned, she signed a statement
and she was allowed to return to her home. 10 2
When the plaintiff arrived at her home, she discovered Pip-
pin on her porch waiting to talk to her.10 3 According to Ms. Ben-
nett, they both sat on the porch and drank coffee while the
sheriff questioned her about the shooting. 10 4 Ms. Bennett al-
leged that during the questioning, the sheriff touched her leg in
a way that made her feel uncomfortable, and the plaintiff told
the sheriff she did not want to answer any more questions until
the following day.10 5 Ms. Bennett saw the sheriff off the porch
and went to bed.10 6 She awoke and found the sheriff standing
naked over her, attempting to remove her clothes. 10 7 Although
the plaintiff protested, the sheriff told her that he was the sher-
iff and could do what he pleased. 08 Then the sheriff allegedly
raped Ms. Bennett.10 9
The Fifth Circuit held that the finding that the sheriff acted
under the color of law was not erroneous." 0 The court agreed
that the sheriff "wielded coercive power over Gail Bennett.""'
The court reasoned that "the Sheriffs actions were an abuse of
power held uniquely because of a state position"" 2 and "the ex-
plicit invocation of governmental authority constituted a 'real
nexus' between the duties of the Sheriff and the rape.""13
In Dang Vang v. Vang Xiong X. Toyed," 4 the Ninth Circuit
upheld the jury's determination that the defendant acted under
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See Bennett, 74 F.3d at 583.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See Bennett, 74 F.3d at 589.
111. Id.
112. Id. (citing United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)).
113. Id. (citing Doe v. Independent School District, 15 F.3d 443, 452 n.4 (5th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 815 (1994)) (where the defendant took advantage
of his position as a teacher and coach to seduce the plaintiff. The court explained
that the defendant's conduct was taken under the color of state law because a "real
nexus" existed between the activity out of which the violation occurred and the
defendant's duties as a teacher).
114. 994 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1991).
598 [Vol. 19:587
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol19/iss3/7
1999] ALMAND v. DEKALB COUNTY, GEORGIA
the color of state law. 115 The defendant, an employee of Wash-
ington State Employment Security Office, raped women looking
for employment when Toyed met them under the pretext of pro-
viding services pursuant to his job. 1 6 The plaintiffs were
Hmong refugees from Laos and each contacted the defendant
seeking employment." 7 The defendant was unsuccessful in
finding employment for one of the plaintiffs, Yia Moua, never-
theless, the defendant assisted Moua in learning to drive. 118
The defendant picked up Moua and told her that he was going
to take her to a place where they could study for the driver's
exam." 9 The defendant drove Moua to a motel and raped
her.120
The other plaintiff was Maichao Vang, who stated that the
defendant "raped her at least sixteen times and on each occa-
sion he relied on the pretext of a potential employment opportu-
nity."12 During one of the incidents, under circumstances
similar to those surrounding Moua's rape, the defendant repre-
sented to Vang that he was going to help her obtain her driver's
license. 22
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs demon-
strated the elements of a section 1983 claim. 123 The court
stated that it was clear that the plaintiffs' "constitutional right
to be free from sexual assault was violated."124 In determining
that the defendant acted under the color of state law, the court
relied upon the Supreme Court's interpretation that "misuse of
power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only
because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state
law, is action taken under color of state law." 125 Therefore, the
Ninth Circuit held that a reasonable juror could conclude that
the defendant used his government position to contact and sex-
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 478.
118. See id.
119. See Dang Vang, 944 F.2d at 478.
120. See id.
121. Id.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 478-80.
124. Dang Vang, 944 F.2d at 479.
125. Id. (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922 (1982)(quoting
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941))).
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ually assault these plaintiffs, and thus, acted under the color of
state law.126
III. Statement of the Case
A. Facts
In Almand v. Dekalb County, Georgia,127 Mary Almand
brought a section 1983 action against Floyd Bryant, a DeKalb
County police officer, alleging that he raped her while acting
under the color of state law. 128 Almand first encountered the
defendant in July 1990, when she was searching for her daugh-
ter, Monique, who was missing from home. 129 The defendant
offered to assist Almand in her search for her daughter on the
condition that she go out on a date with him.30 Almand did not
accept the date, but she gave the defendant her phone number
so that he could contact her with any information he obtained
about her daughter. 13'
"About one week after [her] disappearance, Monique re-
turned home with the help of the Atlanta Police Department." 32
Almand learned that Monique had gone with a neighbor to
what she believed to be an audition for a concert.133 Instead,
Monique was held against her will in a hotel, where she was
raped by two men. 34 Almand revealed to the defendant what
had happened to her daughter and the defendant expressed
that he had an idea of where Monique had been held and who
the rapists were. 35 At this point, the Atlanta Police Depart-
ment told Almand that what had happened to her daughter had
occurred often in the area and that it was likely that nothing
could be done to find the rapists. 36 One week after Monique's
return home, the defendant called Almand and offered to dis-
close to her important information about her daughter's rape, if
126. See Dang Vang, 994 F.2d at 480.
127. 103 F.3d 1510 (1997).
128. See id. at 1512.
129. See id. at 1511.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. Almand, 103 F.3d at 1512.
133. See id. at 1511 n.2.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 1512.
136. See id.
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she agreed to have sex with him. 137 Although Almand rejected
the defendant's demand for sexual favors, he agreed to continue
to assist Almand with her daughter's investigation. 138
In August 1990, the defendant showed up at Almand's
apartment and wanted to discuss urgent matters about her
daughter. 3 9 The defendant was off-duty and not in uniform. 140
She admitted the defendant and he immediately began to make
sexual advances towards her.'4 ' Almand asked the defendant
to leave, he eventually agreed and walked out the door.142 Al-
mand closed the door behind him but did not have a chance to
lock it before the defendant pushed it open, reentered the apart-
ment, and forcibly raped her. 43
B. Procedural History
Almand filed her complaint in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia against Bryant and
several other defendants. 44 Her complaint invoked, inter alia,
42 U.S.C. section 1983, and alleged that Bryant, a state actor,
had violated her rights under the Fourth and the Fourteenth
Amendments by forcibly raping her. 4 5 Bryant moved for sum-
mary judgment based on qualified immunity, but the district
court denied his motion. 46 Bryant appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, and the court re-
versed and remanded the case to the district court. 147
C. Majority Holding
A majority of the Eleventh Circuit rejected the district
court's decision and held that summary judgment should be
137. See id.
138. See Almand, 103 F.3d at 1512.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 1514 n.10.
141. See id. at 1512.
142. See id.
143. See Almand, 103 F.3d at 1512.
144. See id. The defendants included DeKalb County and others who were
not specifically named in the opinion. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id. All of the other defendants' motions for summary judgment were
granted. See Almand,103 F.3d at 1512; see also supra Part II.C (discussing the
qualified immunity defense).
147. See Almand, 103 F.3d at 1510.
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granted to the defendant on qualified immunity grounds. 148
Upon review, the majority determined that Almand did not es-
tablish that the defendant acted under the color of state law for
the purposes of section 1983.149 The majority explained that
[uin qualified immunity cases, '[a] necessary concomitant to the
determination of whether the constitutional right asserted by the
plaintiff is 'clearly established' at the time the defendant acted
[that is the qualified immunity question] is the determination of
whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional
right at all. 150
Based upon this standard, the majority concluded that the
plaintiff did not assert a violation of a constitutional right be-
cause at the time the defendant raped Almand, he was acting as
a private citizen.151 The majority noted that if the defendant
was acting under the color of state law when he raped her, a
constitutional violation of the right to bodily integrity would
have been asserted.152 Since Almand failed to establish that the
defendant acted under the color of state law, she did not have a
claim under section 1983.153
The majority discussed the criteria necessary for a plaintiff
to prevail on a section 1983 claim, stating that "[a] successful
§ 1983 action requires that the plaintiff show that she was de-
prived of a federal right by a person acting under the color of
state law."15 4 The majority acknowledged that, under certain
circumstances, the rape of a person by a police officer or other
148. See id. at 1510, 1511 n.1. The court notes that on summary judgment all
disputed facts are resolved in the Plaintiffs favor and the Plaintiff is given "the
benefit of all reasonable inferences-for the purposes of reviewing a summary
judgment decision." Id. (citing Rodgers v. Horsley, 39 F.3d 308, 309 (11th Cir.
1994)).
149. See id. at 1511; see also generally supra Part II.C.
150. Almand, 103 F.3d at 1515 n.12 (citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232
(1991)).
151. See Almand, 103 F.3d at 1515.
152. See id.; see also id. at 1516 (dissent notes that the majority conceded that
if there was an action taken under the color of state law, then the plaintiffs consti-
tutional right to bodily integrity was violated).
153. See id. at 1511.
154. See id. at 1513 (citing Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1130 (11th Cir.
1992)) (citing Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1978)).
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state actor could violate the Constitution. 155 As an example of
such circumstances, the majority cited Parker v. Williams and
Dang Vang v. Vang Xiong X Toyed. 56 The majority noted that
Parker involved a rape by a uniformed deputy sheriff of a wo-
man in his custody, made possible because he told her that her
bail had been revoked and that she would have to return to jail
with him.' 57 Dang Vang was also cited as an example of action
taken under the color of state law because the defendant raped
women under the pretext that he could find them employment
pursuant to his state job.158 However, the majority distin-
guished these cases from Almand, because Bryant was not act-
ing under the color of state law at the pertinent time. 5 9
Consequently, the focus of the majority's opinion dealt with
the issue of when a police officer acts under the color of state
law for the purpose of a section 1983 claim. 60 The majority de-
tailed the distinction between an official acting as a private per-
son or as a state actor.1'6 It noted that "not all acts by state
employees are acts under the color of law."' 62 Relying on a
Supreme Court opinion, the majority held that "[tlhe dispositive
issue is whether the official was acting pursuant to the power
he/she possessed by state authority or acting only as a private
person.' 63 Here, the majority agreed that the defendant was
not acting under the color of state law, but as a private person
when he forcibly reentered Almand's home and raped her. 64 It
was likely that the defendant's first entry into Almand's home
was acquired under the color of state law because he claimed
that he had information about Almand's daughter, in order to
155. See id.; see also Parker v. Williams, 862 F.2d 1471 (11th Cir. 1989). Bod-
ily integrity derived from the Fourth Amendment and applied to the States
through the Fourteenth.
156. See Almand, 103 F.3d at 1513.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 1511.
161. See Almand, 103 F.3d at 1513.
162. Id. (citing Edwards v. Wallace Community College, 49 F.3d 1517, 1523
(11th Cir. 1995)).
163. Almand, 103 F.3d at 1513 (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183-84
(1961), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436
U.S. 658 (1978)).
164. See Almand, 103 F.3d at 1514.
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gain access.165 However, the majority determined that the de-
fendant's forcible reentry and his rape of Almand were private
acts because he did not accomplish them by using his status as
a police officer.166 It further explained that by breaking into Al-
mand's apartment and forcibly raping her, "he was no different
from any other ruffian," and that these acts were not "made pos-
sible only because the wrongdoer [was] clothed with the author-
ity of state law."167
The majority distinguishes Almand from cases such as Ben-
nett v. Pippin and Dang Vang, where the defendants' acts were
accomplished due to their status as state officials. 16 The major-
ity noted that the Bennett defendant's statement, "I can do what
I want, I'm the sheriff' intimidated the rape victim and over-
came her resistance. 169 It also noted that the Dang Vang de-
fendant "used his government position to exert influence and
physical control over the plaintiffs." 70
Because Almand did not establish that the defendant was
acting under the color of state law pursuant section 1983, it re-
mains that the defendant was acting as a private individual and
therefore, no constitutional right was violated. Finding no con-
stitutional violation allowed the majority to opine that the de-
fendant was entitled to qualified immunity from the plaintiffs
section 1983 claim. 7 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit re-
versed the decision of the district court and granted the defend-
ant's summary judgment motion.
D. Dissenting Opinion
The dissent maintained that, assuming the defendant did
rape Almand, there was at least a genuine issue as to whether
he did so under the color of state law.' 72 Focusing on the ele-
165. See id. at 1514-15.
166. See id.
167. Id.
168. See id. at 1515.
169. See Almand, 103 F.3d at 1515 (citing Bennett v. Pippin, 74 F.3d 578, 589
(5th Cir. 1996)).
170. Id. (citing Dang Vang v. Vang Xiong X. Toyed, 944 F.2d 476,479 (9th Cir.
1991)).
171. See id. at 1515 n.12.
172. See Almand v. DeKalb County, Georgia, 103 F.3d 1510, 1516 (11th Cir.
1997) (Aldrich, J., dissenting).
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ments of section 1983 which provide for the plaintiff to show
that (1) a person acting under the color of state law (2) deprived
her of a right secured by the United States Constitution or other
federal laws, 173 the dissent observed that under certain circum-
stances, it has been accepted that a rape by a police officer could
violate a constitutional right, successfully fulfilling the ele-
ments of a section 1983 suit.174 Therefore, the dissent con-
cluded that since "there was a genuine issue as to the
circumstances under which the Bryant may have raped Al-
mand, there was a genuine issue as to whether the defendant
deprived her of a constitutional right."175
Similar to the majority, the dissent also explored the issue
of when a defendant acts under the color of state law for the
purposes of section 1983.176 The dissent, relying on the
Supreme Court's interpretation of section 1983, noted that "a
defendant acts under the color of state law when he exercises
the power 'possessed by virtue of state law and made possible
only because the wrong doer is clothed with the authority of
state law."' 177 The dissent concluded that a defendant "acts
under the color of state law when he abuses a position given to
him by the state."178
The dissent opined that there was a genuine issue of mate-
rial fact as to whether Almand's rape was made possible only
because the defendant abused his position as a police officer.179
In order to support its opinion, the dissent relied upon the evi-
dence of the unlocked door through which the defendant forcibly
reentered Almand's apartment. 80 Almand unlocked her apart-
ment door and allowed the defendant to enter because he had
173. See id. at 1516 (citing Duke v. Smith, 13 F.3d 388, 392 (11th Cir. 1994)).
174. See Almand, 103 F.3d at 1516. The dissent refers to the portion of the
majority opinion where they discuss circumstances under which a rape by an offi-
cial could violate the Constitution. The dissent concludes that "[tihe majority ap-
parently concedes that, if Bryant did rape Almand under the color of state law,
then he violated her constitutional right to bodily integrity." Id. (citing Albright v.
Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271-73 (1994)).
175. Almand, 103 F.3d at 1516.
176. See id.
177. Id. (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 50 (1988)).
178. Almand, 103 F.3d at 1516.
179. See id. at 1516.
180. See id.
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told her that he had police business to discuss with her.','
Although the defendant did leave upon Almand's request, he
reentered before Almand had a chance to lock the door. 8 2 The
dissent asserted that "a reasonable fact finder could find that
Bryant's position as a police officer induced Almand to unlock
the door so that he could rape her."8 3 Furthermore, the dissent
refuted the majority's contention that the defendant was like
"any ruffian" because a ruffian could not have raped the plain-
tiff in the same way as the defendant did.8 4 Therefore, the de-
fendant's act of raping Almand was made possible only because
of his role as a police officer, and he acted under the color of
state law. 8 5
The dissent concluded that the defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, which requires
inquiry into whether a constitutional right was violated, should
not have been granted. 8 6 Because a reasonable fact finder
could conclude that the defendant raped Almand under the
color of state law and violated her constitutional right to bodily
integrity, the qualified immunity question could be answered in
the affirmative. 8 7 Thus, according to the dissent, Almand's sec-
tion 1983 claim should not have been dismissed.
IV. Analysis: The Difficulty of Drawing the Line Between a
Public Official's Private and Public Actions
The Supreme Court has interpreted the acting under the
color of state law requirement for a section 1983 claim broadly
to allow for damages against state officers. 88 Whenever there
is a misuse of power by a state officer, whether authorized or
not, the Court has held that the officer acted under the color of
state law. 8 9 However, the Court has acknowledged that not all
unlawful acts by police officers are committed under the color of
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. Almand, 103 F.3d at 1516-17.
184. See id. at 1517.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
189. See Friedman, 554 PLU/Lit at 15.
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state law; they may be private acts.190 In order to distinguish
between an official's public and private acts for the purposes of
section 1983, the Court ruled that "the dispositive issue is
whether the official was acting pursuant to the power he/she
possessed by state authority and not acting only as a private
citizen."191
In Almand, the majority restricts the Supreme Court's
reading of acting under the color of state law by drawing the
line at the front door of Almand's apartment, thereby holding
that the defendant was acting as a private citizen when he
crossed over that line and reentered the apartment.192 In mak-
ing the decision that the defendant did not gain entry into Al-
mand's apartment "by virtue of any authority he might have
been given by the state to act as a police officer,"193 the court
relies upon other federal court opinions that have interpreted
the Court's misuse rule involving a rape by a state officer. 94
Although those defendants' actions were found to be under the
color of state law, this court was able to distinguish the above
cases.
195
A. The Problems with the Majority's Argument for
Distinguishing Relevant Precedent
In Almand, the majority held that under certain circum-
stances a rape by a state official could violate a person's consti-
tutional right to bodily integrity and relied on Parker as a case
where those circumstances existed. 196 It distinguished Parker
but did not give a detailed explanation. 97 It merely noted that
Parker involved a rape by a uniformed chief jailer that was
made possible because he had told the plaintiff that her bail had
been revoked and she had return to jail. 198 As a result, the
190. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
193. Almand, 103 F.3d at 1515.
194. See id. The majority compares Bennett v. Pippin, 74 F.3d 578 (5th Cir.
1996) and Dang Vang v. Dang Vang Xiong X. Toyed, 944 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1991)
and notes that these cases are distinct from Almand. See id.
195. See Almand, 103 F.3d at 1513, 1515.
196. See id. at 1513.
197. See id.
198. See id.
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plaintiff left with the defendant, and he raped her.199 The court
appears to distinguish the two cases based on the fact that the
defendant in Parker was in uniform and Bryant was not.
200
However, this is a weak argument and may be easily refuted by
the majority's own concession that if Bryant had raped Almand
upon his initial entry, there would have been action under the
color of state law. 20 1 Since Bryant was neither on duty nor in
uniform at the time of his initial entry,20 2 it may be determined
that the majority does not place a great deal of emphasis on
this factor.
The issue in Dang Vang v. Vang Xiong X. Toyed is parallel
to that in Almand,20 3 and thus, was relied upon by the major-
ity.20 4 It distinguished Dang Vang based on the fact that
"Hmong refugees were 'in awe' of government officials" and a
reasonable jury could have concluded "that the 'defendant used
his government position to exert influence and physical control'
over the plaintiffs."20 5 The majority reasoned that, unlike Dang
Vang, there was no evidence that the defendant's status as a
police officer was related to his conduct. 20 6 However, there are
more similarities between the two cases than differences and
consequently, the majority's reasoning is problematic in light of
all the evidence.
The plaintiffs in Dang Vang came into contact with the de-
fendant because of their need for employment, 207 and in Al-
mand, the plaintiff came into contact with the defendant
because of her need for police assistance in finding her daughter
and then later her daughter's rapist.208 In Dang Vang, the
plaintiffs had an understanding that defendant and his depart-
ment could be relied upon to supply jobs to Hmong refugees, 20 9
and Almand had understood that the rest of the department
had given up on the investigation and relied on the defendant to
199. See id.
200. See Almand, 103 F.3d at 1513, 1515.
201. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
204. See Almand, 103 F.3d at 1513, 1515.
205. Id. at 1515.
206. See id.
207. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 19:587608
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol19/iss3/7
1999] ALMAND V. DEKALB COUNTY, GEORGIA
continue the search for her daughter's rapist.210 The Dang
Vang court concluded that the jury could have found that each
plaintiff was raped during a meeting with the defendant related
to provision of services pursuant to his state employment.211
Likewise, in Almand, a reasonable jury could have found that
the defendant gained access to the plaintiffs apartment on the
pretense of discussing police business in order to rape her.212
The majority also distinguishes Dang Vang on the grounds
that the defendant there was acting under the color of law at
the "pertinent time" (the time of the rape), and that Bryant was
not.21 3 The defendant in Dang Vang raped the plaintiffs during
meetings, under the pretense of providing them with state serv-
ices.214 The majority notes that Bryant's police duties ended
when the plaintiff closed the door, and that he was no longer
acting under the color of state law when he reentered and raped
her.21 5 It placed a great deal of importance on this notion of
"pertinent time."21 6
However, the majority devalues the importance of the "per-
tinent time" factor by citing Bennett, as a case where action
under the color of state law was properly found.217 In Bennett,
as in Almand, the rape occurred after the plaintiff asked the
state officer to leave.218 If pertinent time is as decisive a factor
as the Almand majority espouses it to be, then Bennett, would
have been decided differently. Nonetheless, action under the
color of state law was found in Bennett. The majority finds Ben-
nett distinguishable for a different reason and shifts its focus to
the fact that the defendant in Bennett explicitly invoked his au-
thority through the use of a verbal statement.21 9 The majority
ignores the pertinent time factor it deemed so important in
Dang Vang.
210. See supra note 135-38 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 116-26 and accompanying text.
212. See generally supra Part III.A.
213. See Almand, 103 F.3d at 1513.
214. See id.
215. See supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
216. See Almand, 103 F.3d at 1513.
217. See id. at 1515.
218. See supra notes 105-07, 141-43 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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Due to the Bennett defendant's statement that he was the
sheriff and that he could do what he pleased,220 the majority
concluded that the defendant there "overcame [the plaintiffs]
resistance by intimidation linked to his authority."221 The ma-
jority could not find this linkage between intimidation and state
authority in Almand.222 Instead, it noted that Bryant, "resorted
to sheer force to break, to enter, to rape, and his status as police
officer had no bearing on his wicked behavior."223
However, other evidence in Almand would allow a reason-
able juror to conclude that Bryant coerced Almand into allowing
him into her home only because he was a police officer con-
ducting an investigation.224 Almand was on a quest to find her
daughter's rapist, and the police department had told her that it
was likely that nothing could be done to find the rapist.225 The
defendant was her only hope, and he assured her that he would
continue the investigation. 226 Prior to the rape, the defendant
made sexual advances towards Almand, but she tolerated the
defendant's improper behavior because she feared that he
would withdraw his police services and she might never find her
daughter's rapist.227 When the defendant knocked on Almand's
door and asked to come in because he had police business to
discuss, she submitted to his request and allowed him to
enter.228 Any reasonable juror could conclude from the evidence
that the defendant misused his authority to intimidate Almand
and consequently rape her.229 The plaintiff knew who the de-
fendant was, she knew the power he had over her, and she did
not need to be told.230 Thus, the majority's rationale for distin-
guishing this case from Bennett is weak.
220. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
221. See Almand, 103 F.3d at 1515 (citing Bennett, 74 F.3d at 589).
222. See Almand, 103 F.3d at 1515.
223. See id.
224. See supra Part III.A.
225. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
226. See id.
227. See supra notes 130-31, 137-38 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
230. See generally supra Part III.A.
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B. The Dissent's Opinion Offers the Correct Application of
Section 1983
The Supreme Court has not yet decided a section 1983 case
where a police officer raped a person during a police investiga-
tion or other police business. However, the Court has inter-
preted section 1983 in a case where a state officer violated
constitutional rights and has given a broad reading of the provi-
sion.231 Therefore, the issue of where to draw the line between a
police officer acting as a private person and as an officer of the
state carrying out police duties is a difficult one for the courts
because there is no bright line, hence it is a fact specific analy-
sis.232 Courts have to rely on the law as stated by the Supreme
Court, which has used broad phrases such as "clothed with the
authority of state law,"233 and "abuse of power held uniquely be-
cause of a state position."234 In accordance with the Supreme
Court's expansive interpretation of under the color of state law,
the dissent in Almand offers the correct application of section
1983 to the facts. 235 The dissent concluded that "defendant's
abuse of his position as an officer of the state made the rape of
Almand possible."236 The dissent was able to distinguish the de-
fendant's rape of Almand "from that of any other ruffian."237
They relied on evidence that the defendant merely had opened a
door that had been unlocked for him because he was a police
officer 238 and concluded that a reasonable fact finder could find
that "Bryant's abuse of his position as a police officer induced
Almand to unlock the door so that he could rape her."239
The dissent relies on the Dang Vang case and argues that it
is analogous to Almand.240 In Dang Vang, the defendant, a
state employee, on the pretense of taking women job hunting,
231. See supra Part II.B.2.
232. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
233. Supra note 7.
234. See Classic, 313 U.S. at 326.
235. See generally supra Part III.D.
236. See Almand, 103 F.3d at 1517; see also notes 183-85 and accompanying
text.
237. See Almand, 103 F.3d at 1517; see also supra note 184 and accompanying
text.
238. See id.
239. See Almand, 103 F.3d at 1517; see also supra notes 184-85 and accompa-
nying text.
240. See Almand, 103 F.3d at 1517.
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lured them to a hotel room and raped them. 241 There, the Ninth
Circuit found that based on the fact that the plaintiffs came into
contact with the defendant because of their need for employ-
ment, the defendant used his government position to rape
them.242 Similarly, the dissent found that Almand came into
contact with the defendant because of her need for police help,
and Bryant used his position to gain access to her home in order
to rape her.243 The dissent notes that "'any other ruffian' could
have raped Almand, but Bryant's status as a police officer made
it possible for him to do so in a way that another could not."244
C. A Proposal for Where to Draw the Line Without Violating
the Expansive Notion of "Under the Color of State Law"
The majority's concern for unwarranted liability that may
be placed on the state, when a police officer is charged as a de-
fendant in a section 1983 suit,245 forced the Almand court to en-
gage in arbitrary line drawing.246 In a somewhat conclusory
manner, the majority decided that the plaintiffs act of closing
the door transformed Bryant into a private actor, as opposed to
an officer acting under the color of state law.247 However, by
hastily dismissing this claim on summary judgment, the court
ignored the "totality of the circumstances" that led to the rape of
the plaintiff.248
Almand first came into contact with Bryant in July 1990,
when she was searching for her missing daughter and he of-
fered to assist her if she went out on a date with him. 249 Once
her daughter was returned home and Almand had learned that
she had been raped, Bryant informed her that he might know
who raped her daughter.250 Later, the Atlanta Police Depart-
ment told Almand that what happened to her daughter was a
common occurrence in the area and that it was unlikely that
241. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
242. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 183.
244. See Almand, 103 F.3d at 1517.
245. See supra note 148-49 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
247. See id.
248. See infra notes 258-61 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
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they would find the rapist.25 1 Shortly after this, and prior to
Almand's rape, Bryant offered to give Almand information on
her daughter's rape if she agreed to have sex with him.252 Thus,
when Bryant showed up at Almand's door in August 1990 to
rape her, Almand had been in contact with the defendant for
one month.25 3 During this time, he had requested sexual favors
in return for his assistance with the investigation for her
daughter's rapist. 254
Disregarding of the aforementioned facts, the majority fo-
cused on the plaintiffs acts of asking Bryant to leave and clos-
ing the door behind him moments before he reentered and
raped her255 as the acts that broke the link between Bryant's
status as a police officer and the rape.256 The majority held that
when the plaintiff closed the door and Bryant reentered, he re-
turned as "any ruffian."25 7
The majority should not have drawn a line at the front
door. Rather, the majority should have balanced the plaintiffs
evidence (the "totality of the circumstances") against the plain-
tiffs act of closing the door (the potentially "link breaking act")
and then decided whether a reasonable juror could conclude
that the closing of the door terminated Bryant's status as a po-
lice officer, thus transforming him into a private actor not
within the realm of section 1983.258 By weighing all of the evi-
dence against the "link breaking act," the court could have ad-
dressed its concern for expanding section 1983 beyond
manageable limits regarding police officers, 259 and remained
within the Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of "under
the color of state law."26° By doing so, this court undoubtedly
would have minimized the significance of the act of closing the
door in light of the overwhelming evidence supporting the plain-
tiffs claim. 261
251. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 129, 139 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 130, 137 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
257. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
259. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
260. See generally supra Part II.B.2.
261. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
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This analysis conforms with the dissent's opinion that there
was enough evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that the
defendant used his status to rape Almand in a way that no
other could. 262 Because Almand had relied on the defendant for
his police services for approximately one month prior to the
rape,263 and because he was the only officer in the department
who continued to investigate her daughter's rape,264 he pos-
sessed a unique power. Aware of this power, Bryant misused it
to make sexual advances and ultimately to get Almand to un-
lock her door and allow him into her home.265 Once the door
was unlocked, this made it easier for Bryant to reenter and rape
Almand.266 Such facts weigh heavily in favor of the plaintiff
stating a section 1983 claim and outweigh the notion that the
plaintiffs act of closing the door marked the end of Bryant's ini-
tial entry into the apartment under the pretense of police busi-
ness.267 The reentrance happened within moments of Bryant's
initial entry.268 The momentary lapse in time between the ini-
tial entry and the reentrance was not enough to break the chain
between Bryant's abuse of state authority and the rape.
V. Conclusion
The factual scenario presented in Almand v.DeKalb
County, Georgia, is a difficult one. Given little guidance by the
Supreme Court, the Almand majority designated the closing of
the plaintiffs front door as the determinative factor in answer-
ing the color of state law issue. Though the court's concern for
limiting the state's potential liability when its police officers en-
gage in illegal conduct is not without merit, had the majority
taken a more comprehensive look at trends in section 1983
cases, it would have expanded the statute's scope to include Of-
ficer Bryant's conduct. Furthermore, not only did this court ig-
nore precedent, but it turned its back on basic civil procedure,
262. See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
263. See generally supra note 253 and accompanying text.
264. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
266. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
268. See generally supra note 143 and accompanying text.
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in which a genuine issue of material fact is left to the jury to
decide.
An appropriate rationale for determining what constitutes
abuse of one's authority as a state actor is that adopted by the
dissent. By holding that Bryant's position as a police officer
made the rape possible, it correctly applied the law. The dissent
makes it clear that Bryant's status allowed him to initially en-
counter the plaintiff, remain in contact with her, coerce her into
unlocking her front door, and ultimately rape her. Bryant com-
mitted this crime in a way that "any ruffian" could not.
The majority's concern for unwarranted liability placed on
state officials is not discredited by this suggested approach.
Rather, the balancing test proposed incorporates both the ma-
jority's concern for unwarranted liability of the state and the
Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of section 1983. By
weighing all of the plaintiffs evidence of state action against the
possible "link breaking act," only then can it be determined
whether a reasonable jury could conclude that the defendant's
action was taken under the color of state law.
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